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Rule Britannia? Cameron’s Renegotiation and the 
Question of Sovereignty 
 








One of the central components of the UK’s EU renegotiation has been the set of 
issues around sovereignty, writes Tobias Lock. He analyses the new ‘red card’ 
mechanism for national parliaments and suggests that the contents of the deal 
must be read in light of the debates on sovereignty in the UK. 
 
As Justice Secretary Michael Gove’s explanation for backing the ‘Leave’ camp 
demonstrates, the question of sovereignty is likely to feature prominently in the 
campaign leading up to the UK’s EU referendum on 23 June. It is the aim of this 
article to assess David Cameron’s renegotiation in this regard. 
 
In his letter to the President of the European Council, Cameron set out four 
demands concerning sovereignty: 1) an end to Britain’s obligation to ‘ever closer 
Union’; 2) a new power for national parliaments to stop unwanted legislation; 3) full 
implementation of the Union’s commitment to subsidiarity; and 4) confirmation 
that the UK’s opt-out on JHA be respected and that national security remains the 
sole responsibility of the Member States. 
 
Suffice it to note here that sovereignty in terms of ‘putting an end to the supremacy 
of EU law’ was never on the cards – in fact it would be incompatible with one of the 
basic and indispensable pillars of the EU legal order: primacy. 
 
It is argued here that, while points 1, 3, and 4 have always been rather meaningless 
legally speaking, so that one could never expect them to yield much in terms of 
fundamental change, David Cameron can consider his negotiation of a red card 
mechanism a success. However, coupled with possible new powers for the UK 
Supreme Court concerning EU law, the Prime Minister may have achieved more in 
the ‘sovereignty basket’ than perhaps expected. 
 
Legal Standing of the Agreement 
 
The sovereignty concerns are addressed in the Council conclusions, which promise 
to incorporate the changes into the EU treaties in the future. The Edinburgh 
Agreement of 1992, which gave Denmark certain opt-outs from the Maastricht 
Treaty, appears to act as a model here. 
 
The heads of state and government published their ‘decision’ regarding Denmark 
alongside the conclusions of the European Council at Edinburgh. This decision was 
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later registered with the United Nations. This suggests that the Council’s decision 
should be regarded as binding under international law. 
 
However, the decision does not conform to the procedure for treaty amendments 
outlined in Article 48 of the Treaty on European Union. This means that, from the 
perspective of European Union law (and of the Court of Justice of the EU), it has no 
legal effect. At the same time, it obliges the Member States to agree in the future 
to include the declaration into a new treaty. In this sense it is legally binding, which 
is as good a success as Cameron could have hoped for. 
 
Turning to the four sovereignty demands, the call for an end to the UK’s 
commitment to ‘ever closer Union’ has always been a bit of a red herring in this 
negotiation. For one, it is a legally fairly meaningless concept as closer Union 
requires treaty change, which depends on the consent of the UK. Moreover, the 
principle is often misrepresented in that its wording refers to an ‘ever closer Union 
among the peoples of Europe’ and not between the Member States. 
 
Nonetheless, the promise to incorporate into a future treaty that the ‘UK is not 
committed to further political integration’ constitutes a promise that at the next 
treaty revision the UK will get its opt-out. It is hardly conceivable that the other 
Member States would reverse on this when the time comes. 
 
Powers for National Parliaments 
 
As far as point 4 is concerned, the Council conclusions merely confirm the UK’s opt-
outs. Again, this does not add anything novel in legal terms. Much the same can be 
said for subsidiarity. The wording of the conclusions is a little cryptic in that it 
makes reference to the procedure in Article 7 of Protocol 2 to the Lisbon Treaty. 
 
This provision already gives national parliaments the opportunity to voice their 
concerns on whether a piece of draft EU legislation complies with the principle of 
subsidiarity. Where one third of national parliaments consider there to be a 
problem, they can issue a ‘yellow card’. If it is a simple majority of parliaments, this 
constitutes an ‘orange card’. 
 
As things currently stand, the two cards force the institution that initiated the 
legislative procedure (in most cases the Commission) to review the draft and give 
reasons for why the proposal is either maintained, amended or withdrawn (yellow 
card), or to issue a reasoned opinion if the proposal is maintained in case of an 
orange card. 
 
The Council conclusions confirm this, but seem to slightly extend the reach of these 
cards by demanding that all institutions take the cards ‘duly into account’. It is 
doubtful whether this will have much practical effect, given that orange cards at 
least must already be considered by the Union legislator (ie the Council and 
Parliament) if the Commission decides to maintain its proposal. Crucially, it is not 
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Closely connected to this is the only real reform that the subsidiarity basket 
promises: the introduction of a red card mechanism allowing national parliaments 
to block legislative proposals. This is clearly inspired by the already existing 
yellow/orange card procedure, but goes further: a red card forces the Member 
States’ representatives in the Council to ‘discontinue the consideration’ of a 
legislative draft, unless the draft is amended to accommodate the concerns 
expressed in the ‘reasoned opinions’ required from national parliaments in order to 
trigger the mechanism. 
 
The Fine Print of the Red Card 
 
We must drill down a little in order to ascertain what this really means. On the face 
of it, it looks like an important empowerment of national parliaments which has the 
potential to change the power dynamics within the EU. 
 
But then, if one analyses the red card mechanism in purely legal terms, one would 
be tempted to doubt that the red card constitutes such an empowerment. First, a 
substantial 55 per cent of parliaments must issue a reasoned opinion that a draft 
act is incompatible with the principle of subsidiarity. 
 
Second, this must happen within 12 weeks – admittedly a good deal better than the 
eight-week window for yellow and orange cards (and oddly inconsistent with it), 
but still very short for any coordination between national parliaments to take place. 
 
Third, it is not enough for national parliaments to merely dislike a proposed 
legislative act for political reasons: the only admissible reason is subsidiarity as 
defined in the treaties. This means that the mechanism does not apply where 
subsidiarity does not apply (ie where the Union has exclusive competence). 
 
In addition, the national parliaments must spell out their specific concerns on 
subsidiarity. One would expect these concerns to include arguments as to why the 
Member States are at least as well able to legislate in this area as the Union – thus 
disproving one of the legal requirements for passing the subsidiarity hurdle. 
 
Fourth, the Council can get around the red card by accommodating national 
parliaments’ concerns. There is, at present, no requirement to send the amended 
proposal back to national parliaments to get a green light on whether their concerns 
have been addressed, so the Council appears to have quite a bit of discretion there. 
 
Fifth, it is unclear to what extent red cards would be amenable to judicial review by 
the Court of Justice: compliance with the principle of subsidiarity is a legal question, 
not a political one and is fully reviewable by the Court. If the Council ignored a red 
card or addressed the concerns raised insufficiently, a legislative act could arguably 
be challenged on that basis under Article 263(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union. 
 
Applying the Red Card Mechanism 
 
However, despite these legal limitations, it seems that the red card mechanism 
possesses a political potency that goes beyond the mere legal text. Even if a red 
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card were based on political considerations instead of concerns about subsidiarity, it 
could nonetheless lead the Council to discontinue (ie not agree to) a piece of 
legislation. This would not happen for legal (subsidiarity) reasons, but for political 
reasons, as perhaps a majority of those sitting in the Council may not wish to 
openly contradict their parliaments on these issues. 
 
Hence if – and this is a big if – national parliaments got their act together and 
cooperated on these matters, they could well hold a trump card in their hands. So, 
will they have to wait for treaty change for this mechanism to be applicable? 
 
In theory, they do, but there is nothing to prevent the Member State governments 
(ie those represented in the Council) from operating this mechanism in an informal 
way even before treaty change is agreed. Surely, no one, not even the Court of 
Justice, can force the Council to agree to a legislative proposal – whether it 
erroneously thinks it is contrary to subsidiarity or not. 
 
Sovereignty Debates in the UK 
 
Beyond last week’s European Council, there is a further aspect to the discussion on 
sovereignty. According to a statement by David Cameron in the House of Commons 
on 3 February, there are plans to ‘put beyond doubt that this House is sovereign’. 
The Prime Minister reinforced this promise on the Andrew Marr Show last Sunday. 
 
This brings back the discussion on a ‘Sovereignty Act’. It has rightly been argued 
that such an act stating something along the lines of ‘the House of Commons is 
sovereign’ does not make much legal sense. It is also unlikely that Parliament will 
expressly legislate to undermine the primacy of European Union law: this would put 
the UK in constant breach of EU law and make membership of the European Union 
unsustainable. 
 
Instead, a subtler assertion of sovereignty might be on the cards. In this regard, it is 
important not to forget the parallel debate on ‘the other Europe’: the Government’s 
plans to repeal the Human Rights Act (implementing the European Convention on 
Human Rights) and replace it with a British Bill of Rights. 
 
At first glance (and at second glance as well), this has nothing to do with Britain’s 
EU membership. But Michael Gove, the Lord Chancellor, has announced before two 
Lords’ committees (here and here) that he was looking into whether the UK 
Supreme Court could be transformed into a constitutional court, which might be 
given powers to declare EU law incompatible with the fundamentals of the British 
constitution. 
 
He also intimated that the Bill of Rights could be used ‘to give effect’ to Protocol 30 
to the Lisbon Treaty, which has famously been found by the European Court of 
Justice not to constitute an opt-out from the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
This article is not the place for a detailed discussion on this topic (some of my 
thoughts can be found here). 
 
Whether this debate will result in a new power for the Supreme Court to declare 
acts of the Union institutions ultra vires or incompatible with the constitutional 
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identity of the UK, or an even further-reaching power to defy the primacy of EU law 
in an even more open way, remains to be seen. Suffice it to say that any assessment 
of the ‘sovereignty package’ is not complete without taking into consideration what 
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